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ABSTRACT 
 
Governing relationships effectively is central to marketing channel performance. Relational 
governance theory singles out two key mechanisms, contracts and norms, and suggests that norms 
surpass contracts in their ability to minimize opportunistic behaviour. Recent research has 
disputed that perspective though, by noting the dark side of norms and calling for a renewed 
perspective on contractual governance.  An analysis of existing empirical research on contractual 
versus relational governance of marketing channels leads into the proposal of four research 
directions that can help better understand why firms keep drafting contracts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
esearch on the governance of marketing channels emphasizes the use of relational norms to curb 
opportunism within channel relationships, while stressing that the effectiveness of detailed contracts 
is a topic of some controversy (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Berthon et al., 2003; Cannon et al., 
2000; Ferguson et al., 2005; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005; Young 
and Wilkinson, 1989). One may then wonder why channel members continue to use contracts to govern the 
relationships with their business partners. Indeed, detailed contracts remain a central coordination mechanism in 
marketing channels, buyer–seller agreements, franchise contracts, and licensing contracts getting signed every day.   
 
The adoption of the relational paradigm by the marketing literature may have led researchers to a too rapid 
emphasis on the use of norms to govern channel relationships. Besides, existing studies on contractual governance 
present some limitations as to the way of measuring the phenomenon. Last but not least, the measure of the 
governing effects of contracts are somewhat unclear, one reason being that parties rarely refer to the contract once it 
has been signed.  
 
Based on an analysis of the contributions and limitations of the marketing literature on the governance of 
channel relationships, this article proposes a series of research directions to renew the investigative framework about 
the use of contracts as a governance mechanism. 
 
GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 The theory of relational governance draws on the analysis of McNeil (1974, 1980), who himself drew on 
MacCaulay’s (1963) research on noncontractual business relationships. According to MacCaulay (1963), contracts 
and contract law tend to be useless and could even have undesirable consequences for interfirm relationships, 
especially considering the many extra-legal sanctions available to manage relationships. For example, an 
organization’s reputation might be tarnished by unfulfilled commitments.  
 
When a contract is inscribed within a business relationship, the contractual obligations often get modified, 
added to, or even replaced by relational norms. Therefore, McNeil offers a more flexible contract law to deal with 
R 
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the increasing difficulty of planning for all contingencies in a business relationship, especially in uncertain 
environments (Hadfield, 1990; McNeil 1974, 1980; Spriggs, 1996). Because an exchange is possible as soon as both 
partners reach an agreement, whether its details are fixed or not, the exchange context can be represented on a 
continuum with one-shot or discrete transactions—characterized by limited communication and narrow content—at 
one end and relational transactions—defined as long-term, complex, continuous relationships—at the other end 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996).  
 
The shift from a transactional to a relational paradigm has prompted a vast body of research in marketing. 
Its richness is reflected in the diversity of the terminology used to illustrate the two modes of governance (see Table 
1).  
 
Table 1: Discrete versus relational governance  
 Exchange Continuum 
Authors Discrete exchange Relational exchange 
McNeil (1974, 1980) Discrete norms Relational norms 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) Simple contract Implicit understandings 
Gundlach and Achrol (1993) Authority-based governance  Social norms governance 
Heide (1994) Unilateral/hierarchical governance Bilateral governance 
Weitz and Jap (1995) Contractual control Normative control 
Lusch and Brown (1996) Explicit contract Normative contract 
Cannon et al. (2000) Contractual agreement Relational social norms 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) Explicit contract Relational norms 
Anderson and Coughlan (2002) Formal contract Informal contract 
Ferguson et al. (2005) Contractual governance Relational governance 
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) Detailed contract drafting Close partner selection 
Boulay (2010) Contract Norms 
 
Marketing research aims at evaluating the effectiveness of formal or explicit contracts compared with that 
of informal or implicit contract (norms), in terms of their impacts on exchange partners’ behaviors, attitudes, or 
performance within a relationship.  
 
CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS: A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
MECHANISM? 
 
 Contracts are “detailed, binding legal agreements that specify the obligations and role of both parties. As 
such, contracts can be considered substitutes for the formal governance mechanisms of hierarchy or integration in 
business to business exchanges” (Ferguson et al., 2005). Table 2 summarizes the findings of key research into the 
efficiency of contracts for governing exchange relationships in marketing channels.  
 
Table 2: Contractual governance, behavior/attitude, and performance 
Authors Governance Mechanism Impact on Behavior/Attitude Impact on Performance 
Boulay (2010) Contract + (compliance)  
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) Detailed contract drafting ns (opportunism)  
Ferguson et al. (2005) Contractual governance  + (exchange performance) 
Cannon et al. (2000) Contractual agreement  + (performance) 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) Explicit contract - (commitment)  
Achrol and Gundlach (1999) Legal contract ns (opportunism)  
Lusch and Brown (1996) Explicit contract ns (relational behavior) ns (economic performance) 
Young and Wilkinson (1989) Written contract  + (conflict)  
ns: non-significant result  
 
Counter intuitively, findings suggest that contracts are not an effective way to govern relationships within 
marketing channels. A relationship based on a detailed/formalized contract might lead either to more conflict 
(Young and Wilkinson, 1989) or to less commitment from the exchange partners (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Most 
studies show no effect at all (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005), 
with the exception of Boulay (2010) in the franchise context. 
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Other research has sought to measure the effectiveness of contractual governance on exchange partners’ 
performance. Cannon et al. (2000) detected a positive effect when the exchange context is characterized by a low 
level of transactional uncertainty. Ferguson et al. (2005) further showed that contractual governance related 
positively to exchange performance in the context of interfirm service exchanges.  
 
These empirical findings—especially in relation to hedging opportunism—challenge the theory of contract 
law which stipulates that contracts are used to reduce opportunistic behavior and the resulting uncertainty by 
establishing formal rules and procedures, which reinforce parties’ commitment to the relationship.  
 
One explanation is that individuals have a level of authority acceptance, within which the benefits of 
accepting authority are greater than its disadvantages, so negative reactions arise when this level is exceeded  
(Buckling, 1973). Writing detailed contracts creates rigidities (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005) that may prompt 
reactions such as a reduced emotional investment in the relationship, a search for other sources of gratification, 
investment in reaching their own goals, or the denial of sources of power to the exchange partner that would enable 
him to reach his own goals (Emerson, 1962).  
 
RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS: FROM PROVEN 
EFFECTIVENESS TO THE DARK SIDE 
 
 Relational governance is defined “as an endogenous mechanism that can enhance exchange performance by 
embedding private and public information flows in a matrix of social ties rather than by resorting to contract or its 
enforcement by a third party, such as courts” (Ferguson et al., 2005). Norms bind exchange partners together by 
prescribing acceptable behaviors (Heide and John, 1992). As Table 3 summarizes, empirical research offers several 
insights into the role of norms as a mechanism for governing exchange relationships.  
 
Table 3: Relational governance, behavior/attitude, and performance 
Authors Governance Mechanism Impact on Behavior/Attitude Impact on Performance 
Boulay (2010) Norms - (compliance)  
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) Close partner selection U-shaped effect on opportunism  
Ferguson et al. (2005) Contractual governance  + (exchange performance) 
Brown et al. (2000) Relational exchange - (opportunism)  
Jap and Ganesan (2000) Relational norms + (commitment)  
Cannon et al. (2000) Cooperative norms  + (performance) 
Achrol and Gundlach (1999) Relational norms - (opportunism)  
Joshi and Arnold (1997) Relational norms - (opportunism)  
Brown and Dev (1997) Relationship performance  + (performance) 
Lusch and Brown (1996) Normative contract + (relational behavior) + (economic performance) 
Gundlach et al. (1995) Relational social norms 
- (opportunism) 
+ (commitment) 
 
Noordewier et al. (1990) Relational governance  + (quantitative performance) 
Young and Wilkinson (1989) Unwritten contract - (conflict)  
 
When exchange relationships are governed by higher levels of relationalism, exchange partners exhibit 
fewer opportunistic behaviors (Brown et al., 2000; Gundlach et al., 1995; Jap and Anderson, 2001) and stronger 
commitment to the relation (Gundlach et al., 1995; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996). Relational 
norms also serve as a moderator between channel members’ dependence and opportunism (Achrol and Gundlach, 
1999; Joshi and Arnold, 1997). These results explain why most research considers relational governance as an 
effective mechanism for curbing opportunistic behavior.  
 
But Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) found recently that close partner selection effects on opportunism were U-
shaped: initially effective in hedging again opportunistic behavior, then increasing rather than attenuating 
opportunism. They call this effect “the dark side“ of relationalism. Boulay (2010) confirmed that result by 
establishing that high levels of relational norms in franchise relationships were linked to less franchisees’ 
compliance with their franchisor’s directives. These results are in line with Hibbard et al.’s (2001) finding that the 
positive effects of relational marketing—trust, commitment, communication, shared values, and dependence—
declined over time. 
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Overall, relational governance literature thus indicates, nearly from the start (Noordewier et al., 1990; 
Young and Wilkinson, 1989), that contracts are less efficient than relational norms to monitor opportunistic behavior 
and performance within marketing channels. Yet more recent studies show that in certain circumstances, this 
assumption simply is not true. Moreover, channel members keep drafting detailed agreements. We believe that one 
central explanation for these results is that their authors missed some conceptual and methodological points.   
 
UNDERSTANDING WHY FIRMS KEEP DRAFTING CONTRACTS: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
 The first two research directions we offer have to do with understanding and evaluating the contractual 
governance of exchange relationships. We then follow with two directions about the need to study plural systems of 
governance and to use a contingency perspective in future research frameworks.   
 
Capacity for contractual governance 
 
 Faced with research findings that suggest that contractual governance has either no or a negative effect on 
opportunistic behaviors, some authors are tempted to revise contract theory by stressing that exchange contracts are 
not designed to limit opportunistic behaviors (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). Beyond questioning the role of contracts 
in the design of channel relationships, this reasoning questions the way researchers measure the contractual 
governance of channel relationships.  
 
The contractual governance concept is quite similar to the notion of formalization (i.e., a set of explicit 
rules and procedures on which channel members base their decisions [Anderson and Coughlan, 2002]), and yet the 
empirical findings from these two research streams do not match. Research into the formalization of channel 
relationships indicates that formalized exchange relations relate to less opportunistic behaviors and channel 
members’ positive attitudes (e.g., Boyle 1994; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1995, 1999).  
 
Marketing scholars investigating contractual governance of marketing relationships should use a measure 
of the phenomenon based on its capacity, rather than on its intensity. By asking channel members if their contract 
clearly delineates each channel members’ role, details precisely what will happen in case of conflict, and so forth, 
researchers have missed a central point: Do exchange partners see contracts as a governance mechanism? Research 
based on a capacity approach could then lead to a less deterministic measure compared to today’s models, by 
questioning channel members not about the contractual specifications of the exchange relationship but rather about 
their perception of the contractual monitoring of the relationship.  
 
Acceptance of contractual governance 
 
 Organizational research suggests that a fairly wielded authority increases the chances that the members of 
an organization will accept it and will then exhibit higher levels of motivation and of satisfaction toward the 
organization (Tyler, 1988). 
 
This concept of fairness has attracted growing interest among marketing researchers; many authors have 
called for its use to specify behaviors within marketing channels (Kumar et al., 1995; Sindhav, 2001). Dwyer et al. 
(1987) stress its importance as a central element for building strong relational exchanges. Samaha et al. (2011) also 
note that perceived unfairness by a channel member can act as a “relationship poison by directly damaging 
relationships, aggravating the negative effects of both conflict and opportunism, and undermining the benefits of 
using contracts to manage channel relationships.” 
 
In turn, research on contractual governance should better integrate this fairness perspective into its 
conceptual frameworks. One research direction is to determine the moderating role of contract fairness on the link 
between contractual governance and opportunism. Researchers should also examine if using contract acceptance as a 
moderator, rather than contract capacities, can provide more fine-grained results.  
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Plural systems of governance  
 
 Based on Bradach and Eccles’s (1989) “price–authority–trust" system, marketing scholars have attempted 
to find appropriate plural systems of governance to hedge opportunistic behaviors and reinforce channel 
performance. A widespread assumption holds that governance mechanisms complement, rather than oppose or 
substitute for, one another. Thus, if the contract can provide a general framework for the relationship, daily 
performance is usually governed by relational norms (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999).  
 
Research in support of these predictions is limited and somewhat contradictory though. Gundlach and 
Achrol (1993) find that relational governance relates inversely to contractual governance (i.e., the effects of 
contracts and norms cancel each other). Cannon et al. (2000) suggest that the role of contracts becomes more 
important when social safeguards exist while Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) observe that detailed contract drafting and 
close partner selection are complementary in fighting opportunism. Boulay (2010) demonstrates that the effects of 
contractual governance on franchisees’ compliance decrease with the level of relational governance.  
 
These results indicate that further research is needed to understand the effectiveness of plural governance 
strategies based on a “contract + norms” combination. Research could integrate, within this combination, additional 
governance mechanisms, such as partner selection procedures, the use of information systems to monitor channel 
activities, and so forth. Defining an open governance system could then extend our understanding of channel 
members’ reactions to each governance mechanism, whether used solely or simultaneously. 
 
Contingent perspective 
 
 While discussing the inadequacy of using legal contracts in uncertain environments, Cannon et al. (2000) 
promote a contingency approach when considering channel members’ reactions to contracts. They suggest that what 
matters most is not the contract by itself but the social context within which it is used. In environments with no 
uncertainty, the need to specify future performance through contracts diminishes (Achrol and Gundlach, 1993). 
 
In addition to adopting this perspective, future research frameworks should include the impact of time on 
the effectiveness of each governance mechanism. Conventional wisdom implies that the effectiveness of a 
governance mechanism evolves over time with the evolution of the life cycle of the exchange relationship. One 
hypothesis is that contract will be useful to govern channel members’ behaviors by enforcing standards and rules at 
the beginning of the relationship or at the end (in case of conflict) while relational norms will serve as a deterrent to 
opportunism during the growth stage of the relationship.   
 
Finally, dependence and power relations between channel members are two other variables that future 
models should include, because they can help explain variations in evaluations of the impact of governance 
mechanisms on channel members’ cooperation (Samaha et al., 2011). 
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